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Mathilde Richard1, Sascha Knauf2, Philip Lawrence3,4,
Alison E Mather5, Vincent J Munster6, Marcel A Mu¨ller7,
Derek Smith8 and Thijs Kuiken1The pandemic potential of zoonotic pathogens lies in their ability
to become efficiently transmissible amongst humans. Here, we
focus on contact-transmitted pathogens and discuss the
factors, at the pathogen, host and environmental levels that
promote or hinder their human-to-human transmissibility via the
following modes of contact transmission: skin contact, sexual
contact, respiratory contact and multiple route contact. Factors
common to several modes of transmission were immune
evasion, high viral load, low infectious dose, crowding,
promiscuity, and co-infections; other factors were specific for a
pathogen or mode of contact transmission. The identification of
such factors will lead to a better understanding of the
requirements for human-to-human spread of pathogens, as well
as improving risk assessment of newly emerging pathogens.
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Infectious diseases are the second leading cause of death
worldwide after cardiovascular diseases [1]. More than
half of the known pathogens that are able to infect
humans are of zoonotic origin [2]. Once a zoonotic patho-
gen has crossed the species barrier by infecting humans,
its success in the human population will depend on
whether or not it can acquire the ability of sustained
human-to-human (H2H) transmissibility. A better under-
standing of the factors that determine this ability would
help to prevent the emergence or re-emergence of infec-
tious diseases in the human population.
Transmission of infectious pathogens amongst humans
can occur via multiple routes: airborne (aerosols and
respiratory droplets) route, faecal-oral route, contact route
or vector-borne route. In this review, we focused on
pathogens that are transmitted via direct or indirect
contact as their main or substantial routes of transmission.
Pathogens that are mainly transmitted via the faecal-oral
and food-borne routes — which also are types of contact
transmission — were excluded because they are dis-
cussed elsewhere in this issue. Direct contact transmis-
sion requires physical contact between an infected person
and a susceptible person and the transfer of pathogens via
touching, sexual contact, or contact with bodily fluids or
lesions. Indirect contact refers to the infection of a sus-
ceptible person via a contaminated surface. We divided
contact transmission into four modes: skin, sexual, respi-
ratory and multiple. We used the following examples to
illustrate these four modes of contact transmission: Trep-
onema pallidum pertenue (TPE) for skin contact transmis-
sion, human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) for
sexual contact transmission, coronaviruses (CoV) for re-
spiratory contact transmission and Ebola virus for contact
transmission via multiple routes. For each of these patho-
gens and their specific mode of transmission, we identi-
fied the factors, at the level of the pathogen, host or
environment that promoted or hindered their ability of
sustained H2H transmissibility.
Skin contact transmission
The spirochete bacterium Treponema pallidum (ssp. perte-
nue; TPE) causes yaws. Another subspecies (ssp. palli-
dum) that causes syphilis is not further discussed here.
Yaws primarily affects the skin, bones and cartilages of
children in hot and humid areas of Africa and Asia and theCurrent Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:7–12
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contact with skin ulcers.
Although TPE is traditionally considered to exclusively
infect humans, it has recently been identified in African
nonhuman primates. The fact that human and simian
TPE strains share a high degree of genetic and functional
similarity suggests that African nonhuman primates may
serve as a reservoir for human infection and highlights the
potential for zoonotic transmission [3].
TPE has obviously acquired the ability of sustained H2H
transmissibility. There are several pathogen factors that
may contribute to this ability. The spirochete evades the
immune response by antigenic variation and abrogation of
opsonizing antibodies [4–6], allowing it to survive perma-
nently in the infected host. It reaches high loads in skin
ulcers and the infectious dose is low. Besides entering a
new host via cuts or abrasions, the [2_TD$DIFF]closely related
T. pallidum pallidum is known to use peptides of the
outer membrane to attach to host surface proteins [7]
and is [3_TD$DIFF]reported to penetrate healthy mucous membranes
[8]. Host factors favouring TPE transmission include
crowded living conditions. High humidity and tempera-
ture are environmental factors that increase TPE survival
outside the host. Finally, lack of surveillance and inade-
quate health care favour the persistence and spread of
human yaws in affected countries.
Sexual transmission
The retrovirus HIV-1 is the archetypal example of a
sexually transmitted human pathogen. Although HIV-1
can be contracted by sexual, percutaneous and perinatal
routes, nearly 70% of infections worldwide result from
heterosexual intercourse [9]. HIV-1 is the causative agent
of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in
humans, characterised by severe depletion of memory
CD4+ T-lymphocytes early following infection, leading
ultimately to immunodeficiency and death due to oppor-
tunistic infections and rare diseases [10]. Sexual transmis-
sion involves the transfer of virus particles or infected
cells present in contaminated genital secretions or blood
from an infected person to the mucosa of a susceptible
host [11 [1_TD$DIFF] . Following transmission, the successfully trans-
mitted founder virus population is established in CD4+
cells in mucosa/submucosa, draining lymphatics, gut-as-
sociated lymphoid tissue and systemic lymphatic tissues.
Viraemia follows and increases exponentially as a result of
massive virus replication in gut associated and other
peripheral lymphoid tissue [11].
HIV-1 likely originated from nonhuman primates at some
time in the twentieth century. The most genetically
similar and related primate lentivirus described to date
is the simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) found in
chimpanzees in central Africa (SIVcpz) [12]. The majority
of nonhuman primate species appear afflicted with aCurrent Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:7–12single strain of SIV that is mostly non-pathogenic in its
natural host.
Important restriction factors by which infected hosts
control lentiviral infection are tetherin [13], APOBEC3G
[14] and TRIM5a [15]. The ability of the most prevalent
strain of HIV-1, the M strain, to overcome such restriction
factors is believed to have been critical to establish an
infection in humans and to allow sustained H2H trans-
mission, leading to the current global pandemic [16]. In
comparison, the reduced abilities of other HIV-1 strains
(N, O and P) and HIV-2 to counteract these restriction
factors [17–19] may partly explain why they were not able
to spread so effectively within the human population.
Other pathogen factors that have contributed to the
‘success’ of HIV-1 M strain as a human pathogen, despite
its relatively low infectivity (risk estimate of 1 in
1000 exposures for heterosexual transmission; [9]), in-
clude its extraordinary propensity to evolve its genome
through recombination and low-fidelity replication, allow-
ing immune and therapeutic escape [20], the nature of its
long, ‘latent’, often sub-clinical infection, during which
patients can transmit the virus [21], and high viral load.
Host factors that favour transmission are the presence of
other sexually transmitted diseases [9], as well as promis-
cuous sexual behaviour.
Respiratory contact transmission
Of the six known human (CoV), severe acute respiratory
syndrome CoV (SARS-CoV) [22] and Middle East respi-
ratory syndrome CoV (MERS-CoV) [23] are responsible
for high morbidity and mortality in infected individuals.
The other four human CoV (HCoV-229E, NL63, OC43,
HKU1) have low pathogenicity and are associated with
seasonal common colds [24].
The zoonotic origin of four out of six human CoV has
been elucidated. HCoV-229E, SARS-CoV and MERS-
CoV originate from bats and HCoV-OC43 from bovids,
whereas animal ancestors for HCoV-HKU1 and NL63 are
still to be found [25]. The common cold CoV likely
emerged a long time ago in the human population, as
reflected by a global distribution and a high prevalence in
humans [26]. In contrast, intermediate host species such
as Himalayan palm civets [27] and dromedaries [28]
likely played a role in the recent introduction of SARS-
CoV and MERS-CoV, respectively, in the human popu-
lation.
SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV are predominantly transmitted
via direct H2H contact, droplets and fomites [29–31], and
have not (yet) established long-term and sustained H2H
transmission. Virus replication occurs mainly in the lower
respiratory tract (LRT) in type II pneumocytes and alveolar
macrophages [32,33,34]. Replication in the LRT may be
explained by the protein expression profile of the respective
receptors, the exopeptidases angiotensin-convertingwww.sciencedirect.com
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peptidase 4 (DPP4) for MERS-CoV [36,37]. In addition,
antiviral immunity of the epithelium may reduce viral
replication in the upper respiratory tract (URT) [38]. For
contact transmission of SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV be-
tween humans, the quantity of infectious particles seems to
be an important factor as high viral loads in patients
facilitated H2H transmission [39,40]. Pronounced stability
of infectious CoV on surfaces for up to several days [41]
could also explain fomite-related transmissions, a phenom-
enon that may contribute to superspreading events [39,42].
In contrast to SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, the four
common cold CoV are predominantly droplet-transmitted
[43] and efficiently H2H transmissible. Virus replication
occurs mainly in the central and upper parts of the
respiratory tract. For HCoV-229E, this may be explained
in part by the abundant expression of its entry receptor,
aminopeptidase N), on non-ciliated cells of the bronchial
epithelium [44]. However, although HCoV-NL63 uses
the same entry receptor as SARS-CoV (ACE2) [45], it
replicates mainly in the URT, perhaps because it uses
additional attachment factors like heparan sulfate proteo-
glycans [46], or because of other as yet unknown viral
replication-related or immune-related factors.
Comparison of these two groups of CoV suggests that
URT replication and droplet transmission (common cold
CoV) is more advantageous for sustainable H2H trans-
mission than LRT replication and direct contact trans-
mission (SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV). Replication in the
URT, as well as transmission via the respiratory route, are
also factors that favour the efficient H2H transmission of
human influenza viruses, as compared to zoonotic avian
influenza viruses [47].
In conclusion, high expression levels of a suitable recep-
tor molecule in the URT combined with efficient and
probably well-balanced viral countermeasures against
local immunity may be major pathogen factors for zoo-
notic CoV to attain successful and sustained H2H trans-
mission, as exemplified by the common cold CoV.
Multiroute transmission
Of the five known Ebola virus species, four are known to
cause disease in humans [48]. Infection with Ebola virus
causes Ebola virus disease (EVD), which is an acute
systemic illness with a high case fatality rate [49].
Of all potential transmission routes, direct contact with
patients or bodily fluids from these patients, as well as
contact with contaminated surfaces or materials, is con-
sidered the most important [50,51]. Ebola virus has in-
deed been isolated from several bodily fluids such as
blood, breast milk and semen of infected patients. In
addition, Ebola virus RNA has been detected in sweat,
tears, stool, on skin and from vaginal and rectal sampleswww.sciencedirect.com[52]. During the 2014 outbreak, several researchers spec-
ulated about the potential for airborne transmission of
Ebola virus [53]. However, the majority of EVD patients
in previous outbreaks were infected by contact transmis-
sion and all EVD outbreaks, including the 2014 epidemic,
have been contained without measures against airborne
transmission in the general population. This suggests that
extensive airborne transmission is unlikely and of limited
epidemiological importance. The 2014 EVD outbreak
revealed the potential for Ebola virus to be sexually
transmitted. Infectious virus and Ebola virus RNA have
been detected in semen from male EVD survivors as long
as 70 and 270 days, respectively, after recovery from the
initial infection [54]. This detection of infectious Ebola
virus and viral RNA months after recovery from EVD
highlights the potential for Ebola virus to seed new
outbreaks after patients with clinical EVD are no longer
present and an area is declared Ebola virus free.
The putative animal reservoirs for Ebola viruses are bats,
and zoonotic transmission is thought to occur either by
direct contact with bats, or via indirect transmission by
contact with bats, or via indirect transmission by contact
with other infected wildlife species, such as gorillas,
chimpanzees or duikers, which — like humans — are
affected by Ebola virus [55].
Amongst the pathogen factors that promote H2H trans-
mission of Ebola virus is the high virus load in secreted
bodily fluids combined with a very low infectious dose, as
low as 10 plaque forming units as measured in experi-
mental infection studies in nonhuman primates [56].
Amongst host factors, ancestral funeral and burial prac-
tices of deceased EVD patients, in which levels of Ebola
virus remain high after death, have been identified as a
major source of human infection [57]. Moreover, the
2014 outbreak of EVD in West Africa, caused by the
Zaire Ebola virus, has shown, for the first time, the ability
of Ebola virus to cause a long-term large-scale epidemic
with sustained H2H transmission [58]. In addition to
EVD cases in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, travel-
associated cases with subsequent nosocomial transmis-
sion have been reported in Mali, Nigeria and the United
States. The 2014 Ebola virus strains were relatively
closely related to viral strains from the previous two Zaire
Ebola virus outbreaks in Democratic Republic of Congo,
and, although the evolution rate of the genome of the
Ebola virus during the 2014 outbreak was higher than the
between-outbreak rate, the virus did not change substan-
tially [58,59]. The clinical course, for example, incu-
bation time, symptoms and development of the disease,
as well as the transmissibility of the virus (R0, basic
reproductive number) were not different from those in
past outbreaks of Ebola virus. Most likely, the unprece-
dented epidemic of Ebola in 2014 was the result of
a combination of human behavioural and societal
factors [60]. Firstly, West African countries never hadCurrent Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:7–12
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case of Taı¨ Forest ebolavirus infection in the 1980s in
Ivory Coast. In addition, Guinea, Sierra Leone and
Liberia are amongst the poorest countries in the world,
with impaired public health infrastructures. Moreover,
compared to previous outbreaks of Ebola virus, the virus
was not confined to remote and rural areas and the
outbreak spread into large population centres, such as
Monrovia, Conakry and Freetown. The spatial connec-
tivity provided by roads and a travelling population
allowed for the rapid dissemination of Ebola virus over
these three countries, before a targeted international
response was initiated.Figure 1
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Despite being categorised under one heading, contact-
transmitted pathogens may differ substantially in their
specific modes of transmission: via skin, via genital mu-
cosa, via respiratory mucosa, or via several of these modes.
Nonetheless, several factors were identified that were
common amongst at least two modes of transmission.
Therefore, it is important to identify both factors promot-
ing H2H transmission that are common amongst contact-
transmitted pathogens and factors that are specific for
each mode of contact transmission (Figure 1). Common
pathogen factors were immune evasion, high viral load,
and low infectious dose. Common host factors werectors
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were specific to one of the modes of transmission and the
pathogen described. Specific factors that may be critical
for efficient H2H transmission are high viral load in skin
lesions for skin contact transmission, promiscuous sexual
behaviour for sexual contact transmission, URT replica-
tion and a switch from contact to aerosol transmission for
respiratory contact transmission and burial practices for
the transmission of Ebola virus. Identification of these
factors is critical to assess the risk of contact-transmitted
zoonotic pathogens gaining efficient H2H transmissibili-
ty, and to implement mitigation measures and large scale
prevention campaigns in case of outbreaks.
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